By Sabri Boubaker, Duc Khuong Nguyen
This publication fills the space among theories and practices of company governance in rising markets through offering the reader with an in-depth knowing of governance mechanisms, practices and situations in those markets. it truly is a useful source not just for tutorial researchers and graduate scholars in legislations, economics, administration and finance but additionally for individuals training governance akin to lawmakers, policymakers and overseas organisations selling top governance practices in rising international locations. traders can make the most of this booklet to higher comprehend of those markets and to make really apt funding decisions.
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Extra info for Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: Theories, Practices and Cases
Except for Belgium and the Netherlands, all countries feature companies with a voting right ceiling. In Spain, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland the voting right ceiling is the most important exception to the ‘one share – one vote’ principle. These voting right ceilings prohibit shareholders from voting above a certain threshold irrespective of the number of shares they hold. The percentage of companies that have voting right ceilings are highest in Spain (41 %), and Czechoslovakia (35 %), and lowest in Denmark (3 %) and United Kingdom (3 %).
Based on this observation, the authors 2 Khanna and Yafeh (2007) argue that in underdeveloped countries, concentrated control by business groups may be more efficient for poorly-managed economic institutions. Some control by management may also prevent expropriation by other control groups, and control can also motivate monitoring. Adams and Ferreira (2008) present a detailed review of this literature. 8 C. Ghosh and M. Petrova concluded that unifications in Italy generally increase firm value, but also induce wealth transfer from the minority to the majority shareholders of the firm.
Quoting from a recent survey of 464 firms in 16 European countries, Adams and Ferreira (2008) note that 44 % of the companies have some control-enhancing mechanisms, including 27 % pyramids and 24 % dual-class share structures. A priori, it would seem that ownership concentration through differential voting structure would hurt the interest of minority shareholders. However, while the majority of papers that examine this issue have come to the conclusion that the dual-class and other differential voting structures have adverse impact on the value of firms, the consensus on this issue remains illusive.